ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF NONPROFITS: SHOULD HOSPITALS RECEIVE SPECIAL CARE?

Cory S. Capps, Dennis Carlton and Guy David

Economic Inquiry, 2020, vol. 58, issue 3, 1183-1199

Abstract: Nonprofit hospitals receive favorable tax treatment in exchange for providing socially beneficial activities. Extending this rationale suggests that nonprofit hospital mergers should be evaluated differently than mergers of for‐profit hospitals because suppression of competition may also allow nonprofits to cross‐subsidize care for the poor. Using detailed California data, we find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more likely than for‐profit hospitals to provide more charity care or offer unprofitable services in response to an increase in market power. Therefore, we find no empirical justification for applying, as some courts have suggested, different antitrust standards for nonprofit hospitals. (JEL I11, L1, L44)

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12881

Related works:
Working Paper: Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care? (2017)
Working Paper: Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive Special Care? (2010)
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