How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks

Dmitriy Knyazev

Economic Inquiry, 2023, vol. 61, issue 2, 413-429

Abstract: I present a model of corruption with incomplete information where the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the citizen for providing a service. I show that corruption is detrimental to social welfare and consider a new policy to prevent it. I propose punishing bureaucrats who take bribes and rewarding citizens who report such cases. Neither punishment nor rewards can prevent corruption alone. However, the proper combination of punishment and rewards completely prevents corruption. I also show that higher bureaucracy increases corruption in equilibrium and makes it harder to combat it.

Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13125

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:413-429

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... s.aspx?ref=1465-7295

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Tim Salmon

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().