The effect of the anti‐corruption campaign in China: Evidence from housing transactions

Yongqiang Chu, Weida Kuang and Daxuan Zhao

Economic Inquiry, 2025, vol. 63, issue 4, 1232-1251

Abstract: Using price discounts government officials receive when buying new housing units as a measure of corruption in China, we examine the effect of the anti‐corruption campaign launched by the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. We find that the discounts decrease sharply after the campaign. On the other hand, we find no effect of the campaign on existing housing sales. Furthermore, officials become less likely to purchase housing units with lucky numbers. Overall, the results suggest that the anti‐corruption campaign is effective in curbing corruption.

Date: 2025
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