The Incumbency Effects of Signalling

Francesco Caselli, Tom Cunningham, Massimo Morelli () and Inés Moreno Barreda

Economica, 2014, vol. 81, issue 323, 397-418

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="ecca12060-abs-0001">

Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.

Date: 2014
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