Revealing inequality aversion from tax policy and the role of non‐discrimination

Kristoffer Berg

Economica, 2025, vol. 92, issue 366, 483-506

Abstract: Governments have increasing access to individual information, but they exploit little of it when setting taxes. This paper shows how to reveal inequality aversion from observed tax policy choices of such governments. First, I map governments' priorities into concerns for vertical and horizontal equity. While vertical equity underlies inequality aversion, horizontal equity introduces a restriction against tax discrimination. This restriction affects the measurement of inequality aversion. Second, I apply the model to a hypothetical gender tax using Norwegian tax return data. The main result is that inequality aversion is overestimated when horizontal equity is ignored.

Date: 2025
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