Terrorism, counter‐terrorism, and voting: The case of Turkey

M. Akif Yardimci

Economics and Politics, 2024, vol. 36, issue 2, 901-927

Abstract: This paper empirically tests the impact of terrorism and counter‐terrorism on voting by focusing on the two 2015 general elections in Turkey ‐ and the 2011 general election. This period offers a unique case because, after the first election, the ongoing peace process between the incumbent party (AKP), the political party associated with the perpetrators (pro‐Kurdish political party, HDP), and the imprisoned leader of the terrorist organization (PKK) was canceled. Instead, terror attacks recurred and curfews were implemented as counter‐terrorism measures. This enables the impact of curfews and terror attacks on electoral outcomes to be analysed in a difference‐in‐differences setting. Terror attacks are estimated to reduce the incumbent's vote share by 3.2% points, while increasing the vote share of the party associated with the perpetrators by 3.6% points. Curfews are estimated to cancel out the impact of terror attacks in attacked municipalities and decrease the incumbent's vote share by 4.7% points in non‐attacked municipalities.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12274

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:36:y:2024:i:2:p:901-927

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0954-1985

Access Statistics for this article

Economics and Politics is currently edited by Peter Rosendorff

More articles in Economics and Politics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().