Fool’s Gold: Business Power and the Evolution of the Conflict‐free Gold Standard

Ainsley Elbra

Global Policy, 2020, vol. 11, issue 3, 336-346

Abstract: This article examines the role of business, through the World Gold Council, in the evolution of the Conflict‐free Gold Standard (CFGS). Using document analysis of meeting minutes, augmented by interviews with key participants, it is demonstrated that through the use of structural and discursive power, mining firms were able to socialise other actors (governments and NGOs) into accepting a business‐friendly standard. During the consultation process, the standard was weakened sufficiently as to allow business to continue to pursue opportunities in conflict zones. It is argued that the CFGS does little to address the issue of mine site conflict, but instead serves as a mechanism to reassure gold investors and consumers. The paper concludes that the Conflict‐free Gold Standard, like many private governance initiatives, is unlikely to address the issue it purports to. And, that, firms’ contribution to global governance should be cautiously viewed in this light.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12804

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