Behind closed doors: Informal influence on United Nations staffing and pathologies of international bureaucracies

Tianhan Gui

Global Policy, 2024, vol. 15, issue 4, 615-630

Abstract: This research explores the mechanisms through which member states informally shape staffing decisions in the United Nations, extending the traditional view of influence beyond mere structural power within international organizations. Interviews with UN officials uncover three primary informal governance tactics: leveraging financial contributions, nurturing social networks, and fostering educational and institutional pathways for grooming candidates. These strategies subtly impact UN staffing, policy development, and access to sensitive information. The study points to the UN's structural challenges, such as reliance on voluntary funding and decentralized administration, which, coupled with the intertwined interests across organizational levels and the lack of effective oversight mechanisms, enable member states' informal influence. This environment not only restricts the involvement of developing countries but also undermines the UN's legitimacy and effectiveness. The findings illuminate the intricate dynamics of power within IOs, underscoring the need for a comprehensive understanding of influence and its implications for global governance.

Date: 2024
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