Harnessing network power: Weaponised interdependence in global tax policy

Rasmus Corlin Christensen

Global Policy, 2025, vol. 16, issue 1, 175-189

Abstract: For decades, global tax policy has grappled with the challenge of mobile capital, failing to harness the regulatory potential of network power. This oversight has allowed tax havens to flourish, and multinational corporations and wealthy elites to circumvent state authority, undermining national fiscal policies and democratic capacity to meet grand societal challenges, such as climate change and inequality. But recent regulatory innovations pave a different way forward. This article spotlights the dynamics of ‘weaponized interdependence’, suggesting a critical role for strategically targeting global corporate and financial networks in reinvigorating action against tax havens, tax avoidance and tax evasion. Identifying and exploiting network chokepoints – financial institutions, corporate subsidiaries and expert intermediaries – can empower states to reassert their sovereignty and counterbalance the structural advantages of global capital. This approach helps us understand how and why recent regulatory measures have effectively countered financial secrecy, profit shifting and sanctions evasion, repairing public finances and restoring democratic integrity. In an age where weaponised interdependence is predominantly linked to national security, this recasting of global tax policy highlights a progressive path for using network power to develop effective global economic frameworks, strengthen democratic capacity and address contemporary challenges.

Date: 2025
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