False Twins: Intergenerational Injustice in Nuclear Deterrence and Climate Inaction

Franziska Stärk

Global Policy, 2025, vol. 16, issue 5, 945-954

Abstract: Nuclear deterrence and climate inaction wrong future generations by imposing potential existential harm through climate‐related disasters and nuclear winter. While increasingly explored in tandem, key differences in their intergenerational justice dimensions are overlooked. First, the timelines for imposing harm differ. Climate risks cumulate and intensify across generations. In contrast, the longer nuclear weapons are retained, the greater the probability of nuclear war at some point, without it necessarily becoming more probable at any particular point. Nuclear risks are transient, meaning that risks from past choices resolve if catastrophe is avoided. Yet if elevated risk levels persist, the probability of some future generation facing the aftermath of nuclear war cumulates. While the long‐term trajectory is grim, the threat appears manageable at each point in time. Second, incentives for immediate versus delayed action to tackle underlying challenges vary. The appeal of fossil fuels is expected to wane, whereas the perceived benefits of nuclear deterrence are likely to endure. Third, the salience of intergenerational implications of nuclear weapons is diminishing, while climate impacts grow tangible. Despite shared moral dilemmas, nuclear‐related intergenerational injustice is particularly difficult to recognize and address. Acknowledging this discrepancy matters for how we approach our obligations to posterity.

Date: 2025
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