A stability property in social choice theory

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly and Shaofang Qi

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 14, issue 1, 85-95

Abstract: A social choice function g is stable if whenever an alternative x is selected at profile u and then profile u* is constructed from u by only switching x with yfor one individual i who has y just below x at u, then rule g selects either x or y at u* and not some third alternative. Stability is strictly weaker than strategy†proofness but strong enough to establish two kinds of impossibility theorems.

Date: 2018
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