Managerial Opportunism and Capital Structure Adjustments: Equity–for–debt Swap and Convertible Debt

Nobuyuki Isagawa

International Review of Finance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 1, 53-69

Abstract: This paper shows how capital structure adjustments through an equity–for–debt swap and convertible debt can resolve the inefficiency caused by managerial opportunism. We consider a situation in which a corporate manager's investment decision is affected by the firm's debt level. Although both an equity–for–debt swap and convertible debt can induce the self–interested manager to undertake only value–increasing projects through capital structure adjustments, there exists a significant difference between these two financial instruments. An equity–for–debt swap, which requires the agreement of both shareholders and debt holders, can change a firm's debt level only prior to the manager's investment decision. On the other hand, convertible debt, which gives debt holders a unilateral right to convert, can change a firm's debt level even after the manager's investment decision.

Date: 2002
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