Price Effects of Target Ratcheting: A Progress Report on Medical Devices

Daiya Isogawa and Hiroshi Ohashi

The Japanese Economic Review, 2019, vol. 70, issue 3, 331-340

Abstract: Regulators, who have asymmetric information concerning the technology of regulated firms, often rely on incentive‐based regulation. While such a scheme is well known to be vulnerable to the adverse incentives of regulated firms, empirical research that quantifies the magnitude of distortion caused by incentive regulation is scarce. This paper is a progress report of our recent project on target ratcheting with an application to medical devices in Japan. A casual observation of detailed product‐level transaction data and reduced‐form analyses indicate the existence of pricing distortion in the wholesale market. The paper also proposes a two‐period bilateral bargaining model to match the data. A preliminary analysis finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that target ratcheting distorts the pricing of regulated firms, but the magnitude of the distortion is estimated to be economically small.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12235

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