Collusion and Information Exchange

Yu Awaya

The Japanese Economic Review, 2019, vol. 70, issue 3, 394-402

Abstract: Antitrust authorities view that exchange of individual firms’ sales data is more anti‐competitive than that of aggregate sales data. In this paper, I survey antitrust implications of such inter‐firm information exchange. I argue that both types of information exchange are anti‐competitive under some circumstances. More precisely, I compare profits when each type of information exchange is allowed to that when firms can only observe their own sales (Stigler’s secret price‐cutting model), and the former is bigger than the latter. I also provide a general method to bound the equilibrium profits without such information exchange.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jere.12241

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:70:y:2019:i:3:p:394-402

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().