Public, Private and Nonprofit Regulation for Environmental Quality

Lucie Bottega () and Jenny De Freitas

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2009, vol. 18, issue 1, 105-123

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco‐label provided either by an NGO or a for‐profit private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00209.x

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Working Paper: Public, Private and Non-Profit Regulation for Environmental Quality (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:18:y:2009:i:1:p:105-123

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