LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS

Raymond Fisman, Nikolaj A. Harmon, Emir Kamenica and Inger Munk

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2015, vol. 13, issue 5, 871-905

Abstract: Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Labor Supply of Politicians (2012)
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