Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions

I. Serdar Dinc and Isil Erel

Journal of Finance, 2013, vol. 68, issue 6, 2471-2514

Abstract: This paper studies government reactions to large corporate merger attempts in the European Union during 1997 to 2006 using hand‐collected data. We document widespread economic nationalism in which the government prefers that target companies remain domestically owned rather than foreign‐owned. This preference is stronger in times and countries with strong far‐right parties and weak governments. Nationalist government reactions have both direct and indirect economic impacts on mergers. In particular, these reactions not only affect the outcome of the mergers that they target but also deter foreign companies from bidding for other companies in that country in the future.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:68:y:2013:i:6:p:2471-2514

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