The Stock Market and Bank Risk‐Taking

Antonio Falato and David Scharfstein

Journal of Finance, 2025, vol. 80, issue 6, 3223-3261

Abstract: Using confidential supervisory risk ratings, we document that banks increase risk after going public compared to a control group of banks that filed to go public but withdrew their filings for plausibly exogenous reasons. The increase in risk improves short‐term performance at the expense of long‐term performance. We argue that the increase in risk stems from pressure to maximize short‐term stock prices and earnings once the bank is publicly traded. After going public, banks owned by investors that place greater value on short‐term performance increase risk more, and those managed by CEOs with more short‐term compensation also increase risk more.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13502

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:80:y:2025:i:6:p:3223-3261

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