EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

Heber Farnsworth and Jonathan Taylor

Journal of Financial Research, 2006, vol. 29, issue 3, 305-324

Abstract: We surveyed 396 portfolio managers about the structure of their compensation. Overall, more compensation packages are subjective/discretionary than objective/formula based. Firm success factors such as firm profitability have more effect on bonuses than do client success factors such as investment performance. Differences in the structure of compensation across firms, clients, job types, and manager characteristics reflect likely differences in the underlying contracting environments, especially differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance and exerting control.

Date: 2006
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