TYING IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTI‐HOMING

Jay Choi

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, vol. 58, issue 3, 607-626

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two‐sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi‐homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi‐home and makes platform‐specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare‐enhancing if multi‐homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi‐homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi‐homing is prevalent.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00426.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing (2007)
Working Paper: Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:3:p:607-626

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().