Increased (Platform) Competition Reduces (Seller) Competition

Shana Cui

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2025, vol. 73, issue 2, 285-315

Abstract: Policymakers have expressed concern that when a dominant online platform acts both as a marketplace and as an active seller, it might disadvantage its rival sellers and thereby harm consumers. I examine whether platform competition might be promoted to protect consumers. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that increased platform competition can reduce seller competition, and thereby harm consumers.

Date: 2025
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