OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS WITH A UTILITY-MAXIMIZING AUDITOR

S Baiman, Jh Evans and J Noel

Journal of Accounting Research, 1987, vol. 25, issue 2, 217-244

Keywords: Auditing; Contracting; Principle-agent model; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D86 M40 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:25:y:1987:i:2:p:217-244

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DOI: 10.2307/2491016

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