Balancing Performance Measures

Srikant Datar, Susan Cohen Kulp and Richard A. Lambert

Journal of Accounting Research, 2001, vol. 39, issue 1, 75-92

Abstract: This paper uses an agency theory model in which the agent's actions are multi‐dimensional to analyze the optimal weights to apply to performance measures in a compensation contract. We show how the optimal contract trades off the congruity of the overall performance measure with the desire to minimize the risk imposed upon the agent. In contrast to the single action case, we find that an increase in the sensitivity of a performance measure to an agent's action does not necessarily increase the weight placed on that performance measure, even if that measure is perfectly congruent with the firm's outcome.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:39:y:2001:i:1:p:75-92

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