Temporal Profitability and Pricing of Long‐Term Care Insurance

Larry A. Cox and Yanling Ge

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2004, vol. 71, issue 4, 677-705

Abstract: Equilibrium models of dynamic insurance markets can be bifurcated according to underlying assumptions about whether or not insurers commit to long‐term contracts. The difference is substantial in that commitment models imply price highballing over time while no‐commitment models indicate price lowballing. Extant empirical studies provide mixed evidence, however. We use long‐term care (LTC) insurance data, which allow us both to better control for heterogeneous, observable risk, to examine dynamic profitability and pricing in a relatively young, innovative insurance market. Our tests generally indicate temporal price lowballing, thereby providing support for the no‐commitment models.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4367.2004.00108.x

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