The Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies: The Role of Heterogeneous Risks and Guaranty Funds

James A. Ligon and Paul D. Thistle

Journal of Risk & Insurance, 2007, vol. 74, issue 4, 851-862

Abstract: We examine a market with observably heterogeneous risks and a government sponsored guaranty fund and consider whether it is optimal to form a single insurer or separate insurers for each consumer type. Given the economic environment, pooling never dominates the formation of separate insurance companies. This result provides an incentive for the phenomenon of insurance fleets.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00237.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:74:y:2007:i:4:p:851-862

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=0022-4367

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Risk & Insurance is currently edited by Joan T. Schmit

More articles in Journal of Risk & Insurance from The American Risk and Insurance Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().