Indirect Consequences of Locally Observed Corruption on Taxpayers' Motivation to Cheat on Taxes

Abu Bakkar Siddique

Kyklos, 2025, vol. 78, issue 2, 648-681

Abstract: Corruption undermines the fiscal agreement between governments and taxpayers, thereby reducing the motivation to fulfill tax obligations and leading to a rise in dishonest behavior among citizens. To examine the effects of corruption, this study utilizes the locally observed corruption question, which provides a new measure of corruption at the local level, in contrast to corruption measures offered by the typical national corruption perception question. Employing a multilevel hierarchical mixed‐effect modeling approach, the analysis reveals that locally observed corruption substantially diminishes tax morale, a metric that assesses individuals' willingness not to cheat on taxes. Additionally, this paper identifies various factors that mediate the effects of corruption, including fairness in the tax system, ethnic diversity, and public policies. Furthermore, the study conducts several hypothesis tests to eliminate potential alternative explanations, such as the influence of peers and reduced expected costs of cheating resulting from exposed corruption.

Date: 2025
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