Tactical Refereeing and Signaling by Publishing

Sergey Popov

Kyklos, 2026, vol. 79, issue 1, 172-182

Abstract: Peer review is usually conducted to allocate limited resources, such as the budget of a funder or the pages of a journal. Limited capacity may bias peer evaluations, precisely because approving a peer's worthy project consumes capacity, jeopardizing the referee's own project's chances. I show that limiting capacity is inconsistent with a hypothesis that the decision‐maker desires to stimulate efforts. I show that the desire to strengthen the signaling message of the acceptance decision could lead to limiting the capacity, endogenously creating a tragedy of informational commons problem.

Date: 2026
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https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.70021

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Working Paper: Tactical Refereeing and Signaling by Publishing (2022)
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