Credible collusion in a model of spatial competition*

Raquel Arévalo and José‐María Chamorro‐Rivas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: José María Chamorro Rivas ()

Papers in Regional Science, 2007, vol. 86, issue 4, 633-642

Abstract: Abstract. In a spatial model with quantity setting firms, we analyse the possibility of cooperation in a long‐term relationship, where firms compete in location. It is found that endogenizing the location decisions makes collusion more difficult.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1435-5957.2007.00138.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:presci:v:86:y:2007:i:4:p:633-642

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