THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION

Gregory M. Gazda and M. Jeffery Kallis

Review of Policy Research, 1983, vol. 2, issue 3, 516-526

Abstract: Using a legal system of strict liability allowing contributory negligence as a valid defense provides an alternative to consumer protection regulation. In addition, the strict liability system allows rapid and responsive compensation to injured individuals. Corporate uncertainty as to future costs and business environment are substantially reduced, thus allowing firms to make accurate and rational long‐term, strategic plans. This paper presents the basic functional constructs required for developing a viable regulatory framework using strict liability and then looks at an example where it could be employed. The scenario deals with an environmental pollution and protection problem. In the example, a strict liability system allowing for a defense of contributory negligence is shown to be conceptually more efficient and desirable than the existing regulatory system and negligence liability procedures.

Date: 1983
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1983.tb00737.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:revpol:v:2:y:1983:i:3:p:516-526

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.wiley.com/bw/subs.asp?ref=1541-132x

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Policy Research is currently edited by Christopher Gore

More articles in Review of Policy Research from Policy Studies Organization Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().