FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND INTEREST FORMATION: THE CASE OF IMPUTED INTEREST GROUPS

Guy C. Colarulli and Bruce F. Berg

Review of Policy Research, 1983, vol. 3, issue 1, 13-20

Abstract: This paper examines an impact of federal legislation on the formation of political interests; it identifies and defines a phenomenon we have labeled imputed interest groups. The interest groups can be seen when federal legislation makes benefit packages that serve as incentives to interest formation and ties interest groups to the maintenance of these benefit packages. Identification of imputed interest groups necessitates a re‐examination of subgovernments, service deliverer‐recipient relationships, and policymaking in a federal system.

Date: 1983
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.1983.tb00065.x

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