When Does an Inflation Target Yield the Second Best?

Roel Beetsma and Lans Bovenberg

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 103, issue 1, 119-126

Abstract: It is shown that an inflation target does not establish the second best if the central bank is independent and the government collects seigniorage revenues. To eliminate excessive inflation and ensure that stabilization is efficient, society should combine an optimal inflation target with a central bank that attaches less weight to inflation stabilization than the public does.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00233

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:1:p:119-126

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0347-0520

Access Statistics for this article

Scandinavian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Richard Friberg, Matti Liski and Kjetil Storesletten

More articles in Scandinavian Journal of Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().