The Economics of American Sports Leagues

John Vrooman

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 47, issue 4, 364-398

Abstract: Player mobility in North American sports leagues is limited by labour market constraints designed ostensibly to allow teams to recoup player development costs and to maintain competitive balance within leagues. Theory holds that the distribution of talent will be invariant under any institutional configuration, and that while rules to constrain movement will serve to enhance monopsonistic exploitation of talent, they will have no effect on competitive balance. This paper reprises a general theory through which the effects of the labour market constraints can be comparatively analysed for American sports leagues. The economics of sports has been relegated to the realm of labour theory by the unnecessarily limiting assumption that owners of sports clubs are single‐minded profit maximisers. This paper also presents a theory that seeks to unify capital market decisions of financial leverage and ownership syndication with operational labour market decisions for athletic talent and an owner’s desire to win.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9485.00169

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:47:y:2000:i:4:p:364-398

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0036-9292

Access Statistics for this article

Scottish Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by Tim Barmby, Andrew Hughes-Hallett and Campbell Leith

More articles in Scottish Journal of Political Economy from Scottish Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().