Partial Ownership Induces Customised Investments Under Repeated Interaction: An Explanation of Japanese Manufacturer‐Suppliers Relationships

Hodaka Morita

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2001, vol. 48, issue 3, 345-359

Abstract: A dominant manufacturing firm often holds partial shares of its suppliers, and the suppliers are willing to make investments customised to the manufacturer. Furthermore, this type of manufacturer‐suppliers relationship is often long‐term and stable. This paper provides an explanation for this phenomenon by modelling repeated interaction between a downstream manufacturer and upstream suppliers. In the model, the manufacturer could avoid, by partially owning a supplier, hold‐up problems which would arise from the supplier’s customised investment. The model distinguishes between two sources of appropriable quasi‐rents, and yields new empirical predictions concerning the relationship between appropriable quasi‐rents and vertical integration.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:48:y:2001:i:3:p:345-359

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