Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: Extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini (1993), we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations.

Date: 1994-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:205

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