Equity, Envy and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

V. Denicol
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vincenzo Denicolo' ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We show that any social choice function that always selects envy-free Pareto efficient allocations must violate Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Date: 1996-01
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