Identifying Reaction Functions in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Sticky Prices

Luca Lambertini () and Andrea Mantovani

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in a Cournot differential game with sticky prices. We show that first order conditions do not produce instantaneous best reply functions. However, we identify negatively sloped reaction functions in steady state, with the open-loop best reply being flatter than its closed-loop counterpart.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:530

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