Partisan Voting Under Uncertainty

Lily Ling Yang ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We consider a common-value voting model in which voters are uncertain about the precision of the information they receive. With incomplete preference, party supporters adopt their own party as their status quo and vote for it whenever it is justi able under some belief. Uncertainty is ampli ed by strategic consideration. As a result, voting becomes fully partisan and party supporters stick to their own party in large elections, even though all voters share the same preference. Additionally, voting is more partisan when voting is compulsory or when the population of party supporters is sufficiently large.

Keywords: Common values; Elections; Information aggregation; Knightian uncertainty; Partisan voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_574

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