Chips in on a Merger: The Arm-Nvidia Case

Helena Perrone ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the Nvidia-Arm vertical merger through the lens of the recent literature in Industrial Organization. It explores potential competitive concerns surrounding market foreclosure, technological access, and exclusionary behavior, considering the dynamic semiconductor industry’s intricacies. Although limited public information is available due to the parties halting the merger during phase two, I propose four theories of competitive effects addressing issues such as vertical foreclosure in dynamic markets, stifling of innovation due to hold-up concerns, and the ecosystem effects of the merger. This discussion sheds light on the potential impact of this merger in the semiconductor industry on competition in innovative high tech markets such as CPUs, datacenters, gaming consoles, and assisted driving.

Keywords: vertical merger; foreclosure; holdup; ecosystems; semiconductor industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
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