A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

Aram Grigoryan () and Markus Möller ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Keywords: Matching and Allocation; Auditability; Deviation Detection; In centralized mechanisms and platforms; participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence; if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism; participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 101
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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