Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements

Aram Grigoryan () and Markus Möller ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Keywords: Allocation Problems; Robust Market Design; Opaque Announcements; Strategy-Proofness; Transparency We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast; in some environments; weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under opacity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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