Coping with Undesirable Effects of DMA Implementation: Google Search and the Ban on Self-Preferencing

Jens-Uwe Franck () and Mauro Hartl

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: The Digital Markets Act (DMA) accepts certain negative short-term effects on the welfare of users of core platform services in order to achieve fairness and contestability in the long run. In this paper, we illustrate and analyse the more critical case where the regulatory rigidity of the DMA leads to side effects that clearly run counter to these regulatory objectives, as the implementation of the DMA by one platform consolidates the entrenched position of another core platform service. We develop four theses in this regard: (i) such side effects are undesirable but do not justify a limited enforcement of a particular obligation; (ii) adopting specifying measures to prevent such effects would exceed the regulatory leeway granted to the Commission under Article 8(2) of the DMA; (iii) there may be indirect effects on the scope of other DMA provisions that mitigate undesirable effects; (iv) undesirable side effects need to be addressed through anttitrust and other regulatory instruments. As a paradigmatic example, we analyse how the ban on self-preferencing has been implemented by Google with regard to hotel search queries. In doing so, we consider several open questions regarding the ban on self-preferencing and show how the status quo of Google’s display of hotel search results (still) violates Article 6(5) of the DMA.

Keywords: Digital Markets Act; Google Search; self-preferencing; specifying procedure; implementing acts; disintermediation; Booking.com (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-pay and nep-reg
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