The Changing and Growing Roles of Independent Central Banks Now Do Require a Reconsideration of Their Mandate
Goodhart Charles and
Lastra Rosa ()
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Goodhart Charles: Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Lastra Rosa: Professor, Sir John Lubbock Chair in Banking Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London , London WC2A 3JB, UK
Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 457-472
Abstract:
In this paper, we analyse why the changing and growing roles of independent Central Banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate.
Keywords: accountability; central banking; financial stability; independence; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A E5 E58 K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:14:y:2024:i:4:p:457-472:n:1005
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0097
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