 Is Asking Questions Free of Charge? Questioning the Value of Independent Central Banks through the Lens of a European Credit CouncilThiemann Matthias ()
Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 473-484 Abstract: This discussion of Eric Monnet's idea of a European Credit Council evaluates the likely consequences of such a new institution. Based on a critical examination of the notion of economic expertise, it warns that such a council might legitimate an untenable status quo, while bringing little positive benefits. Such a council could however exercise a subversive role if its counterexpertise were to expose the limits to central bank independence in the context of the climate crisis, thus undermining the current set-up. Yet to play such a role would require a degree of confrontation which is unlikely to emerge from the council's envisioned setup. Keywords: Central Bank Independence; expertise; climate change (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:14:y:2024:i:4:p:473-484:n:1006 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium is currently edited by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Yuri Biondi and Shyam Sunder More articles in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium from De Gruyter |
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