The Case for a European Credit Council: Historical and Constitutional Fine-Tuning

Jens van ’t Klooster ()
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Jens van ’t Klooster: Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 519-532

Abstract: Eric Monnet’s European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically-grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet’s (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC.

Keywords: European Credit Council; Central Bank independence; democracy; credit policies; sustainable finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 N24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2022-0074

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