Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

Ashlagi Itai, Braverman Mark, Hassidim Avinatan, Lavi Ron and Tennenholtz Moshe
Additional contact information
Ashlagi Itai: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, itai.ashlagi@gmail.com
Braverman Mark: Microsoft Research New England, mbraverm@cs.toronto.edu
Hassidim Avinatan: MIT, avinatan@mit.edu
Lavi Ron: Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, ronlavi@ie.technion.ac.il
Tennenholtz Moshe: Microsoft Israel R&D Center and Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, moshet@ie.technion.ac.il

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 32

Abstract: We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able to retrieve all the desired properties of the Generalized English Auction, that was not originally designed for players with budgets. In particular, the ex-post equilibrium outcome of our auction is Pareto-efficient and envy-free. Moreover, we show that any other position auction that satisfies these properties and does not make positive transfers must obtain in ex-post equilibrium the same outcome of our mechanism, for every tuple of distinct types. This uniqueness result holds even if the players' values are fixed and known to the seller, and only the budgets are private.

Keywords: position auctions; envy-free allocations; Pareto-efficiency; budget constraints; expost implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1648 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:20

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1648

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().