Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

Alan Beggs

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 13, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: Abstract: This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric Bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent, then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the literature on global games, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.

Keywords: Bayesian games; global games; uniqueness; copulas; risk dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games (2012)
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2012-0012

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