Profits Under Centralized Negotiations: The Efficient Bargaining Case

Domenico Buccella and Luciano Fanti

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 2, 8

Abstract: Making use of a Conjectural Variation model, the present note re-examines the subject of the firms’ profits ranking under different degrees of market competition in a unionized duopoly with industry-wide Efficient Bargaining (EB). It is shown that, while Cournot-like competition profits are always larger than Bertrand-like ones with separated wage negotiations, an uniform wage bargaining can lead to the appearance of the reversal.

Keywords: centralized bargaining; efficient bargaining; conjectural variation model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 J51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0176

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