Single- and Double-Elimination Tournaments under Psychological Momentum

Chen Bo (), Jiang Xiandeng () and Wang Zijia
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Chen Bo: Department of Economics and Laboratory for Mathematical Modelling, Shenzhen MSU-BIT University, Shenzhen, China
Jiang Xiandeng: School of Public Finance and Taxation, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China
Wang Zijia: School of Economics, Renmin University, Beijing, China

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 2, 509-525

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of “psychological momentum” on strategic behavior in single- and double-elimination tournaments. We show that in presence of both positive and negative momentum a single-elimination tournament elicits a higher total effort than that of a double-elimination tournament if and only if the positive momentum is insignificant and the negative momentum is significant. Regardless of momentum effects, a single-elimination tournament elicits a higher average effort per match than a double-elimination tournament does.

Keywords: elimination tournament; psychological momentum; tournament design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 D7 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0187

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