“Company heroes” versus “superstars”: executive pay in Japan in comparative perspective

Waldenberger Franz ()
Additional contact information
Waldenberger Franz: Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich

Contemporary Japan, 2013, vol. 25, issue 2, 189-213

Abstract: In international comparison, the level and the performance sensitivity of executive pay in Japan are low. Both characteristics can be related to the prevalence of internal labor markets. These not only select the ones who will be promoted to the top, but also strongly influence the way by which the level of executive pay is determined. Last but not least, life-long company careers provide for forms of control that can function as a substitute for explicit incentives built into remuneration packages.

Keywords: executive compensation; corporate governance; internal labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/cj-2013-0009 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:conjap:v:25:y:2013:i:2:p:189-213:n:2

DOI: 10.1515/cj-2013-0009

Access Statistics for this article

Contemporary Japan is currently edited by Florian Coulmas

More articles in Contemporary Japan from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().