Proportionality in Crisis Prevention and Resolution Planning: Institutional Protection Schemes and Banking Groups. Some Preliminary Considerations

Lamandini Marco and Bevivino Vito
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Lamandini Marco: Full Professor of Law, Alma Mater Studiorum Università degli Studi di Bologna. Member of the SRB Appeal Panel. Opinions are expressed in personal capacity only and do not necessarily reflect those of the agency. All usual disclaimers apply.BolognaItaly
Bevivino Vito: Assistant Professor of Law, Università degli Studi di Siena, DISAG – Dipartimento di studi aziendalistici e giuridici.SienaItaly

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2025, vol. 22, issue 3, 364-378

Abstract: Although institutional protection schemes (IPS) and banking groups are different forms of legal networks, the reasons for maintaining excessive differences in banking legislation in favor of IPS do not seem entirely justified, or at least could be reconsidered in light of the principle of proportionality.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr-2025-0015

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